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1. Introduction
A large part of the recent debate over health care reform in the United 
States focused on how much government
 involvement is appropriate in the health care 
sector. Nations across the OECD ensure 
universal access to health care for their citi-
zens through national or regional risk pool-
ing financed by mandatory income-related 
contributions (premiums). Ensuring uni-
versal protection against the costs of health 
care and controlling public expenditures 
requires a significant degree of national or 
regional management—a  common feature 
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across these countries. Yet no two health 
systems are identical and OECD countries 
achieve this goal in a variety of different 
ways. Many health systems make substan-
tial use of market mechanisms, for example, 
despite having extensive public funding and 
regulation. 
This paper explores the changing role 
of government involvement in health care 
financing policy outside the United States. It 
provides a review of the economics literature 
in this area to elucidate the implications of 
recent policy changes for efficiency, costs, 
and quality. Economists and health policy 
researchers have written extensively on the 
differences in health care costs and coverage 
rates across countries. In these two areas—
share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
spent on health and share of people without 
any form of health coverage—the United 
States has long been an outlier. However, 
while there are many similarities across “the 
rest” of the countries in the OECD, there are 
also substantial differences in policy design. 
In addition, significant policy changes in 
the last ten years have, in some cases, led 
to a degree of convergence with the United 
States. Examples include the introduction of 
a universal mandate in the United States, the 
move towards a competitive health insurance 
market in Germany and the Netherlands, 
and the adoption of market-like mechanisms 
such as activity-based funding to pay hos-
pitals, selective contracting, and provider 
competition.
To better understand how OECD health 
systems both differ from and have converged 
towards the health system in the United 
States over the past decade, and to organize 
the vast literature on financing health care, 
we specify three financing functions present 
in any health system, whether made explicit 
or not: raising revenue for the health system 
(collection); pooling risk; and purchasing 
services (Kutzin 2001). A fourth dimen-
sion—making coverage decisions (whom, 
what, and how much to cover)—cuts across 
the three functions, as shown in figure 1. We 
use this framework to explore the economic 
literature on the relationship between the 
financing functions and health system per-
formance, drawing on recent work from the 
United States when appropriate.
There are other useful ways of characteriz-
ing health systems. For example, Reinhardt’s 
taxonomy of the components of health sys-
tems distinguishes between government, 
not-for-profit, and for-profit on the pro-
duction side and social insurance, private 
insurance, and no insurance on the financ-
ing side (Reinhardt 2009). We use Kutzin’s 
framework for the following reasons. First, it 
allows for a comparison of any type of health 
system and avoids the use of traditional 
labels (e.g., “tax financed” or “social insur-
ance”). This has the advantage of revealing 
vital similarities and differences between 
systems, rather than obscuring them the 
way that many classifications do. Second, it 
enables us to get away from terms such as 
“private” or “public,” shifting the emphasis 
onto differences in how countries carry out 
the functions, as opposed to differences in 
the legal status of the agents responsible for 
collection, pooling, and purchasing. Third, 
it allows us to focus the review on functions 
rather than on tools and goals. While many 
countries include equity, for example, among 
the goals of the system, this goal is affected, 
under each function, by the nature of the 
tools in use. Similarly, taxes and regulation 
are widely used tools rather than functions of 
the health care financing system. Fourth, the 
framework highlights how health-financing 
functions are more or less independent of 
each other; decisions about how to pool risks 
and purchase services can be made irrespec-
tive of how revenues are raised. 
The research goals for this paper, then, 
are to explore the economic implications of 
the different ways in which OECD health 
systems carry out the financing functions, 
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how policy changes have resulted in more 
market forces within these jurisdictions, 
and the effects of these changes on system 
efficiency, costs, and outcomes (quality). 
We do not review or evaluate the literature 
examining the justification for government 
intervention in the health sector because 
the government plays a major role in financ-
ing health care in all OECD countries, 
including the United States. Also, while we 
analyze the efficiency and effectiveness of 
a number of policy interventions on par-
ticular populations, we are often unable 
to make claims about the overall welfare 
implications of government intervention in 
the countries we examine. 
Our review reveals that there has been 
some convergence in policies adopted across 
countries to improve financing  incentives and 
encourage efficient use of health  services. 
In the case of risk pooling, all countries 
with competing pools experience similar 
difficulties with selection and are adopt-
ing more sophisticated forms of risk adjust-
ment. In the case of hospital competition, 
the key drivers of success appear to be what 
is competed on and measurable, rather than 
whether the system is public or private. In 
the case of both the success of performance-
related pay for providers and issues resulting 
from wait times, evidence differs within and 
across jurisdictions. However, the evidence 
does suggest that some governments have 
effectively reduced wait times when they 
have chosen explicitly to focus on achieving 
this goal. 
The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows: we begin with a brief overview of 
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Figure 1. Conceptualizing the Financing Functions of Health Systems
Source: Adapted from Kutzin (2001).
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the countries we consider in this review. 
We then explore the economics literature 
outside the United States for each of the 
financing functions listed previously, exam-
ining the consequences of public policy 
choices made around financing health care. 
We review the theoretical literature where 
it guides differences between the United 
States and other jurisdictions, although our 
focus is on the empirical economic analy-
sis of health-care financing policy choices 
internationally. We then summarize the 
implications of the evidence and offer some 
general conclusions.
2. Background Information on Selected 
Countries
Although we have no strict criteria for a 
country’s inclusion in our review, we restrict 
our focus to recent literature on health-care 
financing published in economic journals in 
English. As a result, a large amount of the 
work reviewed here focuses on a small num-
ber of countries: Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. 
Figure 2 compares the financing mix in 
these countries and in the United States 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
UK 2011
France 2011
Germany 2011
Canada 2011
Australia 2010
Switzerland 2011
U.S. 2011
General Tax Earmarked Tax Private Insurance Out of Pocket Other
Figure 2. Breakdown of Health Financing by Expenditure Agent
Source: OECD health data (2012).
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in 2011 or the most recent year for which 
data are available. It shows how all seven 
countries use the full range of financing 
mechanisms. Public finance (general and 
earmarked taxes) dominates and its share 
has grown slightly over time in all except 
Germany. The United Kingdom relies most 
heavily on general taxes, followed by Canada 
and Australia, although the extent of the dif-
ference between the countries is partly an 
artifact arising from the way in which the 
data are presented. Statutory health insur-
ance (SHI) funds (funds that are compulsory 
and enforced by law) obtain some of their 
revenue from other tax sources in addition 
to payroll taxes in most European countries. 
Internationally, health-financing data are 
broken down by expenditure agent, rather 
than by collection mechanism. This has the 
effect of obscuring the true “source” of pub-
lic revenues for the health sector. In coun-
tries in which purchasers are SHI funds, 
some nonpayroll tax revenue is invisible in 
international statistics, even when it may be 
substantial; in France it accounts for over a 
third of SHI revenue (Chevreul et al. 2010). 
The corollary is that payroll tax revenue may 
not be visible in countries where central gov-
ernment agencies pool funds and purchase 
health services; in the UK it accounted for 
almost 20 percent of National Health Service 
(NHS) revenue in 2007, the latest year for 
which this figure is available (Boyle 2011).
OECD data indicate that six out of the 
seven countries enjoy universal coverage 
(table 1a).  The basis for entitlement to stat-
utory coverage varies across the countries 
and has changed over time within coun-
tries. Entitlement is based on residence in 
England, Canada, Australia, and France, 
while Germany and Switzerland employ 
universal mandates. Universally compul-
sory coverage is a relatively recent develop-
ment in France, Germany, and Switzerland. 
Switzerland introduced compulsory univer-
sal coverage in 1996 to address concerns 
about unequal access to health insurance, 
gaps in coverage and rising health expendi-
tures (Crivelli 2013 in press). Before 2000, 
SHI in France was compulsory for work-
ers and their dependants and voluntary for 
everyone else; those who could not afford 
to pay the fixed (nonincome-related) con-
tribution for voluntary coverage relied on 
locally administered government subsidies 
(Chevreul et al. 2010). In 2000, France broke 
the link with employment and extended 
income-related contributions to all residents, 
with free access to health insurance for those 
with very low incomes. In 2009, Germany 
introduced compulsory universal coverage 
to stem the growing number of uninsured 
people (van Ginneken and Busse 2009), but 
it maintained the link between statutory cov-
erage and employment.
Germany is the only OECD country to 
allow higher earners to opt out of contribut-
ing to the SHI scheme and to be privately 
covered, instead. Voluntary (private) health 
insurance plays a range of roles across the 
seven countries, as shown in table 1a. With 
the exception of the United States, however, 
its contribution to total spending on health 
does not exceed 15 percent. Measured in 
terms of contribution to total spending on 
health, France, Germany and Switzerland 
have three of the four largest markets for vol-
untary health insurance in Europe (Thomson 
and Mossialos 2009).
Collection agents for the dominant public 
financing mechanism range from national tax 
agencies in England, Canada, and Australia 
and the national social security agency 
in France, to individual health insurance 
funds in Germany and Switzerland. Almost 
uniquely in Europe, Swiss health insurance 
funds are free to set their own contribution 
rates (Thomson et al. 2009) (table 1b). In 
contrast, contribution rates in France and 
Germany are determined by central govern-
ment, long the norm in France but a recent 
development in Germany ( introduced 
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in 2009) (Ognyanova and Busse 2009). 
Switzerland is unique in two other ways. 
First, it uses community-rated, rather than 
income-related contributions to finance 
statutory coverage, and these can vary 
 significantly across funds, even in the same 
canton (region). Second, it requires all citi-
zens, including dependent adults and chil-
dren, to pay premiums, whereas in France 
and Germany SHI automatically covers 
TABLE 1A 
Health Coverage Policy by Country, 2013
Coverage Australia Canada England France Germany Switzerland United States
Breadth: 
population (% 
covered in 2011)
100% covered 
by regionally 
administered 
universal 
program 
(Medicare)
100% covered 
by regionally 
administered 
universal 
program 
(Medicare)
100% covered 
by universal 
program 
(National 
Health Service, 
NHS)
100% covered 
by universal 
program
90% covered 
by public 
program; 
10% covered 
by private 
insurance
100% covered 
by universal 
private 
insurance
31.8% covered 
by national 
program 
for 65+ and 
some disabled 
(Medicare) or 
low-income 
(Medicaid); 
53.1% covered 
by private 
insurance; 16% 
uninsured
Scope: benefits Benefit 
decisions made 
by national 
government 
and informed 
by HTA
Benefit 
decisions made 
by regional 
government 
in conjunction 
with doctors 
and informed 
by HTA
Benefit 
decisions 
made at 
regional level 
and informed 
by HTA at 
national level
Benefit 
decisions made 
at national level 
and informed 
by HTA
Benefit 
decisions 
mainly made at 
national level 
and informed 
by HTA
Benefit 
decisions made 
at national level 
and informed 
by HTA
Benefit 
decisions made 
nationally 
(Medicare), 
regionally 
(Medicaid) and 
by individual 
insurers 
(private 
insurance)
Depth: user 
fees
User fees for 
outpatient 
services 
including 
prescriptions.
No user fees 
for publicly 
covered 
benefits.
User fees for 
outpatient 
prescriptions. 
Capped at £104 
per year for 
people needing 
a large number 
of prescription 
drugs
User fees 
widely applied.
User fees for 
outpatient 
prescriptions. 
Capped at 2% 
income or 1% 
income for 
chronically ill 
or low income
User fees 
widely applied. 
Capped at 
CHF 700 after 
deductible.
User fees 
widely applied.
VHI role ~50% buy 
coverage for 
private hospital 
costs and 
noncovered 
benefits
~67% buy 
coverage for 
noncovered 
benefits
~11% buy 
for private 
facilities
~90% buy 
(or receive 
government 
vouchers) 
for cost-
sharing; some 
noncovered 
benefits
Cost-sharing 
+ amenities 
(~20%); 
Substitute: 
10% opt out 
of SHI system 
for private 
coverage only
Majority buy 
for noncovered 
benefits and 
amenities
Noncovered 
Medicare 
benefits
Note: HTA = health technology assessment; SHI = statutory health insurance; VHI = voluntary/private health 
insurance.
Sources: OECD health data (2012); Thomson et al. (2012).
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dependants at no extra cost to the house-
hold. France also exempts adults with annual 
taxable incomes below €9,020 from paying 
contributions (about 2.3 percent of the pop-
ulation in 2006) (Chevreul et al. 2010).
To secure financial protection for low-
income households, the Swiss cantons oper-
ate a system of premium subsidies within 
parameters defined by the federal gov-
ernment, but with leeway to set eligibility 
thresholds for subsidies and to determine the 
magnitude of subsidies. Until recently, the 
federal government used a system of match-
ing grants to encourage cantons to offer a 
minimum level of subsidy. In spite of this, 
there can be large differences in eligibility 
for subsidies and household premium costs 
across cantons (Thomson et al. 2013). The 
other countries avoid the need for adminis-
tratively complex and potentially inequitable 
subsidies by imposing a national contribution 
rate and linking contributions to income.
As in the United States, people in 
Germany and Switzerland have choice of 
health insurer for publicly financed benefits 
(table 1b). Insurers compete for enrollees 
and are subject to some form of risk-adjust-
ment mechanism, to lower their incentive to 
select risks.
In terms of health care delivery, patients 
in all of the countries can generally choose 
their physician and hospital. Gatekeeping 
(the requirement for a referral for access to 
specialist care) is widely encouraged, often 
through financial incentives. All seven coun-
tries have experimented with different ways 
of paying providers. Fee-for-service payment 
of physicians continues to dominate in all 
except England, while activity-based funding 
through diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) (a 
system that classifies hospital cases/proce-
dures into groups and then assigns payment 
prices for these groups) is rapidly becoming 
the norm for paying hospitals. Efforts to link 
provider payment to performance feature in 
all except Canada and Switzerland.
3. Generating and Collecting Revenue 
How systems transfer money from indi-
viduals to providers has implications for the 
efficiency of both the health system and the 
economy through employment effects and 
deadweight loss. It also affects financial pro-
tection for individuals against loss and the 
pooling of risk and may also affect the rate of 
growth of health-care costs and the respon-
siveness of the health system to changes in 
economic activity. Publicly financed health 
care is usually generated via two collection 
mechanisms—general taxes and earmarked 
taxes (often referred to as social insurance 
contributions, particularly when levied on 
wages)—and often supplemented by user 
fees. General taxes and social insurance con-
tributions affect the medical sector directly 
only because of political economy consider-
ations, while user fees will have direct effects 
on the medical sector. This section first con-
siders the relative efficiency of general taxes 
versus earmarked taxes then looks at user 
fees. The major empirical findings are high-
lighted in table 2.
3.1 General and Earmarked Taxes
The relative efficiency of different types of 
taxes used to finance health systems has been 
explored in the public finance and health eco-
nomics literature. The equity and efficiency 
properties of general taxation (c.f. Auerbach 
1985) do not differ depending on whether 
the money is spent on health or education 
per se, although, if the level of government 
that collects revenue differs from the level of 
government that provides health coverage, 
there may be equity issues and issues about 
whether the level of taxation best meets local 
demand for the services required (c.f. Ahmad 
and Brosio 2006). Of course, the amount of 
deadweight loss associated with any revenue 
generation will depend on the balance and 
type of taxes used to raise the revenue. Once 
again, standard public finance theory on the 
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TABLE 1B 
Key Health Financing Functions by Country (Publicly Financed Benefits), 2013
Function Australia Canada England France Germany Switzerland United States
Collection
Revenue 
sources
General tax 
revenue; 
earmarked 
income tax
Provincial/
federal tax 
revenue
General tax 
revenue 
(includes 
employment-
related 
contributions)
Employer/
employee 
earmarked 
income and 
payroll tax; 
general tax 
revenue, 
earmarked 
taxes
Employer/
employee 
earmarked 
payroll tax; 
general tax 
revenue
Community-
rated insurance 
premiums; 
general tax 
revenue
Medicare: 
payroll tax, 
premiums, 
federal tax 
revenue; 
Medicaid: 
federal, state 
tax revenue
Contributions Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Centrally set; 
dependants 
covered at no 
extra cost
Centrally set; 
dependants 
covered at no 
extra cost
Insurers set 
premiums; 
dependants 
must purchase 
own coverage; 
premium 
subsidies set by 
cantons
Medicare: 
centrally 
determined
Pooling
Nature of 
purchasing 
agent
National 
government 
agency
Noncompeting 
regional 
government 
agencies
Noncompeting 
regional 
statutory 
bodies
Noncompeting 
regional 
statutory 
agencies
Competing 
nongovernmental 
nonprofit 
insurers and 
competing 
private insurers
Competing 
private insurers
Competing 
private 
insurers
Risk 
adjustment 
for competing 
insurers
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable For publicly 
financed benefits
For publicly 
financed 
benefits
For publicly 
financed 
benefits
Purchasing services
Patient choice 
of primary care 
provider
Yes; 
gatekeeping 
required
Yes; 
gatekeeping 
incentivized in 
some regions
Yes, within 
a region; 
gatekeeping 
required
Yes; 
gatekeeping 
incentivized
Yes; gatekeeping 
incentivized
Yes; some plans 
incentivize 
gatekeeping
Usually; 
some plans 
incentivize 
gatekeeping
Patient choice 
of hospital
Yes Yes, through 
GP
Yes Yes Yes Yes Usually
Primary care 
and ambulatory 
specialist 
provider 
payment
Private: FFS Private: FFS/
capitation/
mixed
Private: mix 
of capitation, 
FFS and P4P; 
salary for a 
minority
Private: FFS Private: FFS Private: most 
FFS but some 
capitation
Private: most 
FFS, some 
capitation
Hospital 
payment
Public beds 
(67%): global 
budgets + 
DRGs
Private: FFS
Public and 
private non-
profit: global 
budgets + 
DRGS in some 
provinces
Public: 
mainly DRGs 
and service 
contracts
Public and 
private 
nonprofit: 
mainly DRGs 
and grants
Public beds 
(50%), private 
nonprofit (33%), 
private for profit: 
global budgets + 
DRGs
Public varies by 
Canton: global 
budgets, per 
diem, DRGs
Private non-
profit (70%), 
public (15%), 
private for 
profit: per 
diem + DRGs
P4P Primary care 
and hospitals
No Primary care 
and hospitals
Primary care, 
ambulatory 
specialists and 
hospitals
Primary care No Primary care, 
ambulatory 
specialists and 
hospitals
Note: DRG = diagnosis-related group; FFS = fee-for-service; P4P = pay for performance.
Sources: Cashin et al. (forthcoming); Thomson et al. (2012).
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Table 2 
Selected empirical Papers Reviewed: Raising Revenue
author Time period Country covered Findings
Wagstaff (2010) 1960–2006 OeCD countries adopting SHI (versus tax financing) 
increases per capita health spending; 
reduces the formal sector share of 
employment and total employment; has 
no impact on amenable mortality; but 
performs worse for breast cancer among 
women.
Wagstaff and 
Moreno-Serra (2009)
1990–2004 Central and eastern 
europe and Central 
asia (28 countries)
adopting SHI (from tax financed) 
increased national health spending and 
hospital activity rates, but did not lead to 
better health outcomes.
Finkelstein (2002) 1991–1994 Canada Reducing tax subsidy to employer-
provided health insurance (HI) decreased 
coverage by one-fifth.
Stabile (2001) 1994–1996 Canada Removing tax exemptions to employer-
provided HI would cause levels of 
supplemental HI to decline by roughly 
20 percent.
buchmueller et al. 
(2004)
1998 France Individuals with insurance have more 
physician visits than those without, but are 
no more likely to visit a specialist. 
Gertler and Hammer 
(1997)
Not reported Review article: multiple 
countries, mostly
non-OeCD
User fees are important in cofinancing 
health care, but should not be the primary 
means of finance and should not be 
applied uniformly, or the wealthy will 
benefit and the poor will suffer.
Grootendorst and 
Stewart (2006)
1994–2000 Canada The apparently modest program savings 
attributable to Reference Pricing (RP) can 
be traced back to the design of the policy, 
i.e., factors other than RP.
Tamblyn et al. (2001) 1993–1997 Canada adopting cost sharing decreased use 
of essential and less essential drugs, 
increased rate of serious adverse events 
and emergency department visits in 
elderly persons and welfare recipients.
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relative deadweight loss of income versus 
payroll versus consumption taxes applies, 
regardless of the good being purchased with 
the revenue (Sandmo 1976). 
Economic theory on the relative efficiency 
of social insurance contributions versus gen-
eral taxes suggests that, where the contribu-
tions are applied to an entire population or 
group, without option and without direct 
linkage to the benefit received, the contribu-
tion is equivalent to a tax (Blomqvist 2011). If 
the contribution program is directly related 
to the benefit program, then only the dif-
ference between the contribution required 
and the value of the benefit received will be 
treated as a tax. Although the public-finance 
literature outlines the inefficiencies inher-
ent in earmarked funding, if contributions 
are earmarked for health care, there may be 
political economy reasons (such as transpar-
ency and greater protection from political 
interference) why voters prefer them to taxes 
(Mossialos and Dixon 2002).
Some systems mandate individuals to 
obtain coverage through a network of insur-
ers and may allow insurers to collect some or 
all of the revenue. In such cases, part or all 
of the contribution may be levied in the form 
of a community-rated premium, rather than 
as a proportion of income. There may be a 
single risk pool or multiple risk pools with or 
without public subsidy (we turn to this issue 
in more detail later). Whether government 
collection of revenues is superior or inferior 
to other mechanisms for ensuring finan-
cial security, such as mandating coverage, 
depends on a number of factors (explored in 
Summers 1989). First, mandates and taxes 
on labor can affect the level of employment 
and wages. The extent depends on the sup-
ply of and demand for labor and consequent 
deadweight loss. Mandates, if they are imple-
mented as benefits per worker, will operate 
similar to a lump-sum tax. If certain types of 
employment are exempt (such as part-time 
work), mandates may have large effects on 
the demand for full-time versus part-time 
work. Second, health coverage leads to an 
income effect, the size of which depends on 
the individual’s valuation of the health cover-
age. Third, the governance of public insur-
ance is subject to the usual political economy 
problems of government.
Gruber (2000) provides a simple for-
malization of this analysis that is useful for 
understanding the employment effects. 
Suppose labor demand, Ld, is given by:
 Ld = fd (W + C),
where W is wages and C is insurance cost; 
and labor supply given by:
 Ls = fs(W + αC),
where αC is the monetary value that employ-
ees place on health insurance. In this case, 
α is the valuation of the marginal dollar of 
health insurance. Then it is the case that:
  ∂ W _∂ C  =  
− η d − α η  s 
 _
 η  d −  η  s   ,
where  η  d and  η   s are the elasticities of 
demand and supply for labor. Gruber notes 
that this equation differs from the standard 
incidence of a tax on labor by the term α  η  s , 
which “captures the increase in labor supply 
due to employee valuation of more expensive 
insurance” (Gruber 2000, p. 660).
Valuations of α < 1 may be more likely 
under publicly provided coverage or man-
dates, as contributions to the system are typ-
ically disconnected from benefits received. 
This disconnect occurs whenever redistribu-
tion is an important element of the public 
insurance arrangement and is minimized if 
benefits are valued at their full cost. Where 
insurance is provided, even if individuals do 
not work, then the valuation of the benefit 
(α) will be closer to 0 than if benefits are 
only available to workers (depending on any 
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difference in coverage between workers and 
nonworkers) and the cost will have a larger 
negative effect on employment.
Given that mandated insurance can be less 
redistributive than publicly provided cover-
age, does not necessarily involve centralized 
revenue collection, and does not generally 
involve government provision of insurance 
or services, it is arguable that these inef-
ficiencies are smaller for mandates than 
for publicly provided insurance. Summers 
(1989), therefore, concludes that mandates 
are to be preferred to public provision. On 
the other hand, transaction costs and the 
effectiveness of mandates may be a matter 
of concern. A variety of other economic and 
political factors, including a desire to redis-
tribute through the health insurance system, 
may cause systems to deviate from the theo-
retically superior outcome.
Many health systems explicitly or implicitly 
aim to redistribute income from higher- to 
lower-income individuals. The extent of this 
redistribution is a not a priori related to the 
financing mechanism used, although health 
systems financed through general tax reve-
nues tend to be more redistributive in practice 
than those financed through social insurance 
contributions and those that are more pri-
vately financed (Wagstaff et al. 1992; Wagstaff 
2010). Payroll contributions are often capped, 
unlike income taxes, and if they are progres-
sive instead of proportional, they tend to have 
smaller increases in the marginal rate as they 
move up the income scale. Another important 
element of the extent of redistribution will be 
the utilization of the system by high- versus 
low-income individuals. Once differences 
in access and life expectancy are taken into 
account, it may be the case that the marginal 
dollar allocated to health care is less redis-
tributive than a dollar allocated to education 
or income assistance because higher-income 
individuals are likely to live longer and there-
fore benefit more from the publicly financed 
health-care system (Glied 2008). 
There is a long-standing debate in the lit-
erature on whether health systems financed 
through general tax revenues are better 
able to control health-care costs than those 
financed through social insurance contribu-
tions, and on the relationship between financ-
ing structure and health outcomes. One 
of the difficulties with the literature is that 
characterizing a health system by its primary 
source of finance is akin to painting with an 
extremely large brush. No two  tax-financed 
or social insurance-financed systems are 
alike; for example, the United Kingdom and 
Canada are both tax financed, but there are 
few other similarities. In one recent study, 
Wagstaff (2010) uses system changes from 
general tax financing to social insurance 
within OECD countries between 1960 and 
2006 to examine whether social health insur-
ance leads to increased or decreased cost 
growth. Looking at changes within coun-
tries over time potentially overcomes the 
problems of comparisons across very dif-
ferent systems. However, large changes in 
financing are somewhat rare and may be a 
function of other underlying economic con-
ditions also related to public spending. To 
try and account for the fact that switching is 
potentially endogenous, this study includes 
both difference-in-difference models and 
IV models (using lags of the social insur-
ance indicator variable as an instrument). 
The findings suggest that there is an increase 
in health-care costs of 3 to 4 percent asso-
ciated with a move to social insurance, and 
that this move is related to a decline in for-
mal sector employment of 8 to 10 percent. 
Some of the decline in formal sector employ-
ment may simply involve a shift to nonformal 
employment (presumably to avoid the costs 
associated with social insurance premiums in 
formal employment settings), as the estimates 
on overall employment levels are smaller and 
less robust. The study finds no evidence that 
the transition to social insurance results in 
declines in avoidable  mortality (deaths from 
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specific conditions, such as diabetes, which 
should not occur if timely and effective care 
is available). The results are driven by those 
countries that transitioned from social insur-
ance to tax financed or vice versa, including 
Denmark, Sweden, Italy, and Spain, who 
moved away from social insurance, and a 
number of Eastern European countries who 
moved toward it. 
A related paper (Wagstaff and 
 Moreno-Serra 2009) uses a similar method-
ology to look at a different set of countries 
and time period. They examine transitions 
between one financing structure and another 
among Eastern European and Asian coun-
tries between 1990 and 2003. These transi-
tions were relatively large and fast compared 
to the slower evolution of more developed 
health-care systems. They find even larger 
results for the transition from general 
 tax-financed health care to social insur-
ance financing. Their estimates of increases 
in spending per capita are on the order of 
11 percent, with a 3 percent increase in inpa-
tient admissions (although average length 
of stay declined). Once again, there was no 
evidence of differences in health outcomes 
as a result of financing transitions. Wagstaff 
and Moreno-Serra suggest that physicians 
in these countries saw the transition as an 
opportunity to increase resources in the sys-
tem and, therefore, their incomes, which 
may help explain some of the results. They 
also hypothesize that the transition to social 
insurance led to less integrated systems, 
leaving some people slow to sign up for 
insurance and others not captured by pre-
vention programs, both potentially increas-
ing overall costs. However, the fact that they 
find no overall change in outcomes suggests 
that the magnitude of these types of effects 
must have been fairly small. 
A recent paper by Cylus, Mladovsky, and 
McKee (2012) explores the relationship 
between collection mechanism ( tax-financed 
versus social insurance) and the  relationship 
between economic downturns and 
 health-care spending. Using OECD data on 
 within-country variations for several European 
countries, the authors estimate models of the 
relationship between changes in GDP and 
changes in public health-care expenditures. 
They find that growth in public health-care 
expenditures is more strongly associated with 
changes in GDP (positively) in tax-financed 
countries than in countries primarily funded 
through social insurance contributions. The 
results stem from cost shifting and other 
policy changes in tax-financed countries that 
occurred in economic downturns. While pol-
icy responses to economic crises are clearly 
possible in social-insurance countries as well, 
cost shifting (mainly onto users) did not occur 
to the same extent. The authors hypothesize 
that tax-financed countries are, in general, 
more susceptible to government decisions to 
reduce costs in times of economic crisis. 
Finally, recent work by Baicker and 
Skinner (2011) models the efficiency of rais-
ing revenues to finance rising health care 
costs in the United States (and elsewhere, 
as health-care costs are rising more quickly 
than economic growth in many OECD 
countries). The authors develop a macroeco-
nomic model that accounts for increases in 
health-care spending that improve longev-
ity, but need to be funded through increased 
taxation. In a comparison of raising revenue 
through increased marginal tax rates versus 
less progressive payroll tax, they find sub-
stantial declines in economic growth with the 
former: an 11 percent decline in GDP rela-
tive to the baseline of no distortionary impact 
of tax financing. The efficiency costs are 
lower when less progressive taxes are used 
to finance the increase in costs, although this 
is associated with lower-income individuals 
paying a larger share of the overall costs. Not 
surprisingly, the efficiency cost is also lower 
when less revenue is required to achieve the 
same health gains (increased productivity of 
health spending). 
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3.2 Cost Sharing and User Fees
The third collection mechanism used in a 
variety of health systems is user charges or 
fees (copayments and other forms of cost 
sharing). These generally consist of some 
form of positive price charged to the user 
at the point of service and, from an eco-
nomic theory point of view, can all be mod-
eled as consumer prices (Schokkaert and 
Van de Voorde 2011). User fees generally 
have two purposes, first as a mechanism for 
revenue collection, and second as a mecha-
nism to achieve a more efficient allocation 
of resources. Regarding the second, alloca-
tive efficiency, several studies (c.f. Pauly 
1974) have shown that in the presence of 
moral hazard, the optimal theoretical solu-
tion includes some cost sharing for some ser-
vices. The principal problem here is that the 
individual has information and control over 
future health states that the insurer cannot 
observe. This moral hazard problem results 
in the individual consuming excess care and 
taking less preventative action. The optimal 
solution in this case is for the insured individ-
ual to retain part of the losses (Pauly 1974). 
Others have argued that for nonelective pro-
cedures, cost sharing may lead to inefficient 
outcomes, as individuals place a high value 
on the care purchased from insurance pay-
outs when ill. In this setting, individuals pur-
chase insurance not to avoid risk, necessarily, 
but for a claim on additional income when 
sick (Nyman 2003). 
In the case of cost sharing for the purpose 
of revenue collection, it is not clear, given 
the administrative costs involved and the 
equity considerations, that user fees are an 
optimal means of supplementing taxes and 
contributions in developed health systems. 
Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2011) note 
that strict assumptions about the limita-
tions of public financing mechanisms for the 
health care budget are required for user fees 
to be optimal as a part of the revenue-raising 
basket, namely that government subsidies 
remain fixed in the presence of user fees 
(i.e., that government funds are not crowded 
out) and that the additional revenue is used 
to increase the quantity or quality of health 
services.
International evidence on the effects of 
various forms of user fees as a supplemen-
tal collection mechanism is consistent with 
theory and evidence from the United States. 
Evidence from Canada, for example, which 
examines how individuals who need to pay 
out of pocket for prescription drugs use care 
relative to those who do not, suggests a nega-
tive demand elasticity on the order of those 
found in the RAND experiment (around −.2 
for prescription drug coverage) and greater 
use of publicly financed doctor services 
(Finkelstein 2002; Stabile 2001). Evidence 
from Canada that examines increases in user 
fees for prescription drugs also finds nega-
tive health effects and increased emergency 
room (ER) use for older and low-income 
users (Tamblyn et al. 2001). Evidence from 
France, where voluntary health insurance 
reimburses user fees for publicly financed 
services, suggests that voluntary insurance 
increases utilization and, therefore, publicly 
financed costs (Buchmueller et al. 2004). The 
relationship between out-of-pocket prices 
and utilization holds in a number of other 
countries in the OECD and across a broader 
spectrum of low- and middle-income coun-
tries (Gertler and Hammer 1997). Using 
the introduction of referenced-based pric-
ing in parts of Canada as a quasi experiment 
(where a fee is applied to a user if he/she 
chooses a drug in the same class as the refer-
ence drug but at a higher cost), Grootendorst 
and Stewart (2006) find only modest declines 
in overall drug expenditure when compar-
ing changes in expenditures in the province 
that introduced  referenced-based pricing 
to those that did not. However, the authors 
note that part of the reason for the small 
behavioral response found here may be that 
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the policy was either not applicable or not 
binding for many users, limiting the poten-
tial for savings. There is some evidence of 
movement towards strategies that promote 
efficiency through value-based cost sharing 
(using cost sharing to encourage patients to 
use medication, services, and providers that 
offer better value than other options) rather 
than simply applying user fees across the 
board (Stabile et al. 2013).
Overall, the evidence summarized above 
and reported in table 2 reveals policy changes 
across countries to improve financing incen-
tives and encourage efficient use of health 
services. The evidence suggests that collec-
tion mechanisms alone are not effective in 
managing health care costs or quality. Some 
evidence suggests that financing through 
social insurance is associated with higher 
cost growth over time than financing through 
general tax revenues, but public spending on 
health tends to track GDP more closely (par-
ticularly in recessions) in  tax-financed sys-
tems than in systems financed through social 
insurance. 
4. Pooling Risk
This section examines the literature on 
options for pooling risk and managing adverse 
selection and implications for health system 
efficiency and costs. The major empirical 
findings are highlighted in table 3. Problems 
with adverse selection have long been rec-
ognized in the health insurance literature. 
Individuals with higher expected costs will 
be more likely to seek more generous insur-
ance, and insurance providers in a voluntary 
competitive market will need to price insur-
ance offerings at costs above the average 
value of the benefits package to  offset the 
higher expected costs of both benefits and 
selection (Cutler and Reber 1998). This can 
result in benefits packages that are unafford-
able for many high-cost individuals. Risk 
pooling designed to counter these concerns 
has been a primary objective of many health 
systems. Since information about individu-
als’ health insurance costs is imperfect and 
asymmetric, perfect risk adjustment across 
individuals is unattainable.  Second-best 
solutions in the presence of imperfect infor-
mation lead to a number of potential prob-
lems in practice, including residual selection, 
blunted incentives for providers to manage 
care, a misallocation of individuals across 
plans, or a reduction in choice of insurers 
and type of coverage. 
The theoretical literature on risk pool-
ing offers a number of strategies for deal-
ing with adverse selection given imperfect 
information. One obvious solution is for 
governments to create a single, mandatory 
pool or to have multiple pools but without 
competition and choice between pools. 
While the clear upside to these solutions is 
the elimination of adverse selection prob-
lems, there may also be efficiency costs due 
to the uncompetitive nature of the insur-
ance market. 
Governments that wish to preserve uni-
versal access to insurance without using a 
single pool or eliminating consumer choice 
of insurer can pursue a set of alternate strat-
egies to manage risk selection. They can pro-
vide subsidies to individuals—cash transfers, 
vouchers, tax-favored treatment, tax credits, 
etc.—to enable them to purchase high-cost 
insurance. Van de Ven and Schut (2011) note 
that premium subsidies are unlikely to be 
optimal for three reasons: they reduce the 
incentive for efficient purchasing of insur-
ance by high-risk individuals; they encour-
age excess purchase of insurance and the 
resulting moral hazard effects (Zweifel and 
Manning 2000); and they may create a misal-
location of subsides if the magnitude of the 
premium is based on elements that are not 
relevant for the level of the subsidy (such 
as differences in efficiency among health 
insurers or regional differences in prices). 
In contrast, risk-adjusted subsidies, where 
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TABLE 3 
Selected Empirical Papers Reviewed: Pooling Risk
Author Time period Country covered Findings
Nuscheler and 
Knaus (2005)
1995–2000 Germany Success of company-based sickness funds originates in 
incomplete risk adjustment and the negative correlation 
between health status and switching costs.
Frank and Lamiraud 
(2009)
1997–2000 Switzerland As the number of choices grows, responsiveness 
to price declines allowing large price differentials 
to persist, holding constant plan and population 
characteristics.
Thomson et al. 
(2013)
Belgium, Germany, 
the Netherlands, 
and  Switzerland
Health Insurers (HI) / provider collective negotiation 
in Belgium, Germany and Switzerland curbs HI’s, 
ability to influence quality and costs. Despite Dutch 
HI’s access to efficiency-enhancing tools, data and 
capacity constraints and stakeholder resistance limit 
their use.
van de Ven et al. 
(2007)
2000–2006 Belgium, Germany, 
Israel, the 
Netherlands, and 
Switzerland
Despite risk adjustment systems’ improvement, all 
five countries show increasing risk selection, which 
increasingly becomes a problem, in particular in 
Germany and Switzerland.
Paolucci et al. (2006) 2000–2008 Switzerland Combining universal access and consumer choice of 
HIs is implemented. Challenge: create integrated 
delivery systems for high-quality care in response to 
consumers’ preferences.
Lehmann and 
Zweifel (2004)
1997 –2000 Switzerland The managed care plans benefit from risk selection 
effects. In the case of the Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) plan, however, the pure 
innovation effect may account for as much as two-thirds 
of the cost advantage.
Brown et al. (2011) 1994– 2006 United States Firms reduce selection along dimensions included in 
the risk-adjustment formula, while increasing selection 
along excluded dimensions. Government’s differential 
payments rise after risk adjustment. 
Newhouse et al. 
(2012)
2003–2008 United States Policies—an improved risk-adjustment formula 
and a prohibition on monthly disenrollment by 
beneficiaries—largely succeeded in reducing favorable 
selection in Medicare Advantage.
Colombo (2001) 1996– 2000 Switzerland Measures to improve switching should be accompanied 
by interventions to foster competition on quality and 
efficiency, rather than on risk selection. Promoting 
increase in switching rates might otherwise come at a 
higher price than the benefits.
Einav, Finkelstein, 
and Levin (2010)
2000s United States Recent advances in empirical models of insurance 
have yielded insights into the nature of consumer 
heterogeneity and the possibility that certain kinds of 
welfare losses from asymmetric information, at least in 
some insurance markets, may be modest.
Finkelstein and 
McGarry (2006)
1995–2000 United States Insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric 
information even absent a positive correlation between 
insurance coverage and risk occurrence.
(Continued)
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 payments are based on observable risk fac-
tors such as age, sex, and health status, 
retain consumer price sensitivity and can be 
adjusted over time to reflect changes in con-
sumer risk (van de Ven 2006). Risk-adjusted 
subsidies can be given to individuals or to 
insurers. Alternatively, governments can 
regulate rates and insurance plan features 
and then compensate plans for the expected 
risk pool after the fact (van de Ven and Ellis 
2000).
Where subsidies are provided by govern-
ment to the insurer, individuals are then 
charged a community-rated contribution for 
insurance that is not based on their expected 
costs. Van de Ven and Schut (2011) refer to 
subsidies provided to insurers as risk equal-
ization and note that these are far more com-
mon in practice than subsidies provided to 
individuals, due to lower transaction costs. 
The ultimate success of these risk adjust-
ment mechanisms depends on ability to 
determine risk (van de Ven et al. 2000). 
Glazer and McGuire (2000) show that in an 
optimal risk adjustment framework, prices 
paid to insurers should not only reflect dif-
ferences in costs across patients, but also 
provide incentives for higher quality care 
for the types of patients likely to enroll in 
the plan. Under this type of framework, risk 
adjustment payments would overpay insur-
ers relative to payments based solely on aver-
age costs (Glazer and McGuire 2000). 
Brown et al. (2011) show that firms will 
respond to risk adjustment models by 
a) reducing their screening efforts along 
the dimensions included in the model, and 
b) selecting patients conditional on risk 
adjustment and based on characteristics not 
included in the risk adjustment formula. 
These efforts can result in increases, rather 
than decreases, in the differential payments 
Author Time period Country covered Findings
Fang, Keane, and 
Silverman(2008)
1991–2002 United States Evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap 
insurance market. Its sources include income, 
education, longevity expectations, financial planning 
horizons, and cognitive ability.
Bolin et al. (2010) 2004 Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
and Switzerland
Correlation between risk and insurance was negative, 
but no evidence of heterogeneous  
risk-preferences as an explanation.
Einav, Finkelstein, 
and Cullen (2010)
2004 United States Find adverse selection in employer provided HI, 
however estimate that the quantitative welfare 
implications associated with inefficient pricing in the 
particular application are small, in both absolute and 
relative terms.
Einav and 
Finkelstein (2011)
N/A United States and  
Israel (review of 
other studies)
While private information about risk plays an important 
role in insurance demand in the United States, another 
dimension of heterogeneity—risk aversion—may be just 
as important, or even more so.
TABLE 3 
Selected Empirical Papers Reviewed: Pooling Risk (Continued)
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(the original payment given to the insurer 
to cover someone minus the counterfactual 
costs if the government had covered the costs 
for the person), which would be  counter to 
the objectives of the government in provid-
ing the risk adjustment to the insurer. 
The European health systems with com-
petitive health insurance featured in this 
review—Germany and Switzerland—have 
significantly improved their risk equalization 
schemes in the last ten years and now have 
relatively sophisticated formulas that include 
health-based risk adjusters (Thomson et al. 
2013). In spite of this, insurers’ incentives to 
select risks can be substantial and there con-
tinues to be (largely circumstantial) evidence 
of risk selection (van de Ven et al. 2007) and 
hence, potential inefficiencies in risk pooling. 
Nuscheler and Knaus (2005) investigate 
the effects of the 1996 German reforms 
that allowed for greater competition among 
sickness funds to test for evidence of risk 
selection by company-based sickness funds. 
The reforms increased the number of peo-
ple switching between sickness funds from 
around 6 percent prereform to 10 percent 
three years after the reform. The paper 
suggests that healthier workers had lower 
switching costs and, therefore, were more 
likely to switch funds (to company-based 
funds and regional funds, so switching may 
not have been due to targeted selection 
efforts on the part of company-based funds 
but rather driven by individual selection) and 
that company-based funds with lower premi-
ums enjoyed a healthier pool of enrollees as 
a result of the reforms. 
The Swiss system also promotes choice for 
individuals and competition among health 
insurance providers. Swiss residents can 
choose among thirty-five different sellers of 
insurance for the SHI package (Frank and 
Lamiraud 2009). All individuals are required 
to obtain statutory coverage and, as noted 
previously, there is risk equalization run 
by the state on a canton-by-canton basis. 
Colombo (2001) investigates the effects of 
consumer choice in this context and finds 
that there is little switching behavior, with 
only 3.9 percent of people switching in a 
given year. Frank and Lamiraud (2009) show 
that switching behavior actually declines as 
the number of options available in the Swiss 
context increases. 
Risk selection also can be exacerbated 
by the functioning of the voluntary health 
insurance market when consumer purchas-
ing decisions for the two forms of insur-
ance are linked. For example, if consumers 
have strong incentives to purchase voluntary 
insurance from the same insurer from whom 
they purchase statutory or compulsory cov-
erage (for reasons of convenience or legal 
requirement), and if selection is permitted 
in the voluntary market and desirable for 
insurers but difficult in the statutory market, 
then selection in the voluntary market may 
affect selection in the statutory market. This 
could limit consumer mobility in the statu-
tory market. Swiss citizens are able to pur-
chase complementary voluntary insurance 
to cover services excluded from the statu-
tory benefits package such as some drugs, 
access to certain physicians, and treatment 
outside the canton of residence. Swiss insur-
ers can sell complementary benefits to indi-
viduals that hold statutory coverage with the 
same insurer. In contrast to statutory plans, 
complementary plans are not risk adjusted 
or community rated. Paolucci et al. (2007) 
review whether the complementary insur-
ance market can be used to undermine risk 
adjustment across a number of jurisdictions 
(including Switzerland). They explore how 
the probability that the voluntary market will 
be used for selection in the statutory mar-
ket varies with the strength of incentives for 
risk selection in the statutory market and the 
strength of the links between statutory and 
voluntary insurance, and find prima facie 
evidence that risk adjustment in the statu-
tory insurance market is hampered through 
497Stabile and Thomson: The Changing Role of Government in Financing Health Care
selection in the voluntary market, particu-
larly in Switzerland. 
Additional evidence by Lehmann and 
Zweifel (2004) examines a major Swiss 
insurance company that also offers a man-
aged-care option to better understand the 
extent of risk selection versus innovation 
in explaining the cost differences between 
insurance options in the Swiss context. They 
conclude that, while there is favorable risk 
selection into lower cost insurance options 
such as managed care—selection that is not 
fully captured by the simple risk adjustment 
mechanism—most cost savings are due to 
contractual innovation on the part of the 
managed-care organization.
Although the European countries have 
put in place numerous mechanisms to allow 
individuals to move easily from one insurer 
to another (open enrolment, full cover of 
preexisting conditions, standardized benefits 
etc.) and facilitate insurer competition for 
members (the option for premium variation 
and risk adjustment), there is some evidence 
of barriers to switching for older and appar-
ently less healthy people and, in Switzerland, 
of “inertia” in the face of multiple insurance 
options. This suggests two things: first, choice 
of insurer may not be as great a stimulus to 
enhancing efficiency and quality as expected, 
if insurers only risk losing low-cost individu-
als and, therefore, do not face incentives to 
improve care for higher-cost individuals, 
but instead compete only for the low risks. 
Second, there may be a point beyond which 
insurance options present information prob-
lems that lead to inertia and loss of value for 
the consumer. Thus, the transaction costs of 
insurer competition may be high for individ-
uals and the health system.
The evidence from Germany and 
Switzerland reviewed herein is consistent 
with evidence from the U.S. Medicare mar-
ket. A recent paper by Brown et al. (2011) 
investigates differences between traditional 
Medicare programs for older people and 
 private “Medicare Advantage” (MA) pro-
grams. Despite the fact that these must 
be offered at the same price as traditional 
Medicare programs and the fact that the 
government implemented differential pay-
ment to these programs based on patient 
risk scores, MA programs have dispropor-
tionately enrolled lower-cost individuals. 
Newhouse et al. (2012) also investigate 
recent steps taken to reduce favorable selec-
tion into MA programs, including improved 
risk adjustment through better use of diag-
nostic information on inpatient and outpa-
tient claims forms and changes to make it 
more difficult to leave MA monthly (called 
a partial-enrollment “ lock-in,” which kept 
people in MA for the final nine months of 
the year). They conclude that risk selection 
was greatly reduced, although not to zero. 
Therefore, despite government intervention, 
there is still evidence of some risk selection 
among insurers in the United States. 
U.S. empirical economic literature on 
the demand for insurance has advanced 
our understanding of who seeks insurance 
and why over the past decade. The classical 
economics literature worked from the prem-
ise that buying insurance is more attractive 
for riskier individuals. The more likely an 
individual is to need care, the more likely 
he/she is to buy insurance. For a given price, 
therefore, sicker individuals are more likely 
to buy insurance, all else equal. Einav and 
Finkelstein (2011) note that competitive 
pricing responds to the average insured 
individual, while efficient pricing should be 
based on the marginal individual who is less 
risky than the average individual. Therefore, 
insurance prices tend to be too high, leading 
to underinsurance in the presence of adverse 
selection.
In recent work, however, Einav, 
Finkelstein, and Levin (2010) find that there 
are a number of other dimensions to the 
demand for insurance beyond risk, including, 
importantly, risk aversion. For example, in 
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the U.S. long-term care market, they found 
that in addition to predicted use of long-
term care, individuals who exhibit more pre-
cautionary behavior (through preventative 
 measures such as seat belt use and getting flu 
shots) are more likely to buy long-term care 
(advantageous, rather than adverse selec-
tion), and less likely to use long-term care, 
thereby eliminating adverse selection in this 
market (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006). 
Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) also find 
further evidence of “advantageous” selec-
tion in the U.S. Medigap insurance market, 
along a number of nonhealth or risk-related 
dimensions. Similar results are found in vol-
untary health insurance markets in European 
countries (Bolin et al. 2010). In light of this 
empirical evidence, Einav, Finkelstein, and 
Cullen (2010) estimate the efficiency conse-
quences of selection in the context of a large 
firm and find only modest welfare costs from 
adverse selection. Thus, while all of the stud-
ies reported find evidence of some adverse 
selection, the extent of this selection, and the 
presence of advantageous selection in some 
cases, suggest that the welfare loss tradition-
ally associated with adverse selection may be 
less than previously thought and that con-
cerns about it may have been overstated.
In conclusion, the evidence reviewed in 
this section and summarized in table 3 sug-
gests that countries with competing pools 
experience similar difficulties with selection 
and are adopting more sophisticated forms 
of risk adjustment. The nature of the mar-
ket for voluntary insurance can play a role in 
exacerbating selection. Recent evidence sug-
gests that more detailed data on use, coupled 
with restrictions on ability to change insurer, 
can significantly mitigate risk selection.
5. Purchasing Services
All health systems require the purchase 
of a wide range of goods and services pro-
vided by hospitals, labs, pharmaceutical 
companies, physicians, and other caregivers. 
The purchasing function may be carried out 
by government agencies, insurers, groups 
of doctors acting on behalf of patients, or 
patients themselves. It involves decisions 
about what services to buy, from whom, at 
what price, and under what conditions. Many 
OECD health systems have experimented 
with policies intended to strengthen the pur-
chasing function by moving away from pas-
sive reimbursement of providers. Common 
tools adopted in recent years include hospi-
tal competition, activity-based payment for 
hospital services (or DRGs, a system which 
classifies hospital  cases/procedures into 
groups and then assigns payment prices for 
these groups), and the linking of provider 
payment to performance and outcomes 
( pay-for-performance, P4P). We review the 
literature on recent innovations in hospital 
competition and provider payment in the 
following section and summarize the empiri-
cal literature in table 4.
5.1 Hospital Competition
The NHS in England has, in the last twenty 
years, engaged in several experiments to fos-
ter patient choice of hospital and encourage 
hospital competition. The extent to which 
hospital competition improves quality or 
prices may differ depending on the nature 
of the market. For a thorough review of the 
nature of competition in health care mar-
kets and a summary of the recent research 
in this area, see Gaynor and Town (2011). In 
many markets, prices are set by regulators, 
leading to nonprice competition based on 
quality. Hospital quality is inherently hard 
to measure and has multiple dimensions. 
Some dimensions, such as waiting times, 
are relatively easy to measure. Others, such 
as risk-adjusted mortality, can be more dif-
ficult to quantify. The theoretical effects of 
competition under fixed prices are increased 
quality, with a greater effect where a larger 
number of firms are in the market; quality 
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TABLE 4 
Selected Empirical Papers Reviewed: Purchasing Services
Author Time period Country covered Findings
Gravelle, Sutton, and 
Ma (2010)
2004–2006 United Kingdom Differences between providers in reported disease 
rates and differences in exception rates both 
between and within providers suggest gaming.
Palangkaraya and Yong  
(2013)
2000–2005 Australia Hospitals facing higher competition have lower 
unplanned admission rates. However, competition 
is related negatively to hospital quality when 
measured by mortality, although the effects are 
weak and barely statistically significant.
Campbell et al. (2007) 1998–2005 United Kingdom Introduction of pay for performance was 
associated with a modest acceleration in 
improvement for diabetes and asthma, but not for 
coronary heart disease.
Serumaga et al. (2011) 2000–2007 United Kingdom Pay for performance had no discernible effects 
on processes of care or on hypertension related 
clinical outcomes. Generous financial incentives 
may not be sufficient to improve quality of care 
and outcomes for hypertension and other common 
chronic conditions.
Sutton et al. (2012) 2006–2010 United Kingdom Pay for performance was associated with a 
clinically significant reduction in mortality. 
Duggan (2004) 1989–2000 United States HMO enrolment and the resulting switch from 
fee-for-service to managed care was associated 
with a substantial increase in government 
spending, but no corresponding improvement in 
infant health outcomes.
Rosenthal and Frank 
(2006)
1975–2004 United States There is little evidence to support the effectiveness 
of paying for quality.
O’Reilly et al. (2012) 1990s and 
2000s
England, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
and Ireland
Activity-based funding has been associated with 
an increase in activity, a decline in length of stay, 
and/or a reduction in the rate of growth in hospital 
expenditure in most of these countries.
Bevan and van de Ven 
(2010)
Mid-
1970s–2010
United Kingdom 
and the 
Netherlands
Effectively implementing the fully competitive 
Dutch model requires preconditions to be fulfilled: 
a good risk equalization system, an effective 
competition policy, an adequate system of product 
classification and medical pricing, and transparent 
consumer information on HI products and on the 
quality of health care providers.
Propper, Burgess, and 
Green (2004)
1990s United Kingdom Greater competition is associated with higher 
death rates, controlling for patient mix and other 
characteristics of the hospital and catchment. 
However, the estimated impact of competition is 
small.
(Continued)
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Author Time period Country covered Findings
Propper, Burgess, and 
Gossage (2008)
1991–1999 United Kingdom Relationship between competition and acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI) mortality (as a 
measure of quality) is negative. We also find that 
competition reduced waiting times. Indication 
is that hospitals in competitive markets reduced 
unmeasured and unobserved quality in order to 
improve measured and observed waiting times.
Dusheiko et al. (2006) 1991–1999 England The abolition of fundholding increased 
ex-fundholders’ admission rates for chargeable 
elective admissions.
Dixon, Robertson, and 
Bal (2010)
1990s–2000s England and the 
Netherlands
Similar challenges have been faced. Although 
changes have the potential to generate 
improvements and benefits (e.g., convenience, 
certainty, and choice for patients and efficiency 
gains) they have also generated problems during 
implementation including GP resistance.
Gaynor, Moreno-Serra, 
and Propper (2010)
2003–2007 United Kingdom Effect of competition is to save lives without 
raising costs. Patients discharged from hospitals 
located in markets where competition was more 
feasible were less likely to die, had shorter length 
of stay, and were treated at the same cost.
Gaynor, Propper, and 
Seiler (2012)
2003–2008 United Kingdom Demand elasticity increases with choice, and there 
is substantial heterogeneity in consumer response. 
More severely ill patients become more sensitive 
to quality of care postreform.
Duggan and Scott 
Morton (2010)
2001–2006 United States Part D substantially lowered the average price and 
increased the total utilization of prescription drugs 
by Medicare recipients. The magnitude varies 
across drugs.
Cooper et al. (2010) 2002– 2008 England Postreforms mortality fell (i.e., quality improved) 
for patients living in more competitive markets.
Savage and Wright 
(2003)
1989–1990 Australia When the endogeneity of the insurance decision 
is accounted for, the extent of moral hazard can 
substantially increase the expected length of a 
hospital stay by a factor of up to three.
TABLE 4 
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will also increase as regulated prices increase 
(Gaynor and Town 2011). Propper, Burgess, 
and Green (2004) and Propper, Burgess, and 
Gossage (2008) argue that in markets with 
stricter budget constraints (generally where 
there are large government purchasers or 
where purchaser budgets are determined 
by governments), prices will be relatively 
more important and, therefore, hospitals 
will compete on prices instead of on quality. 
The theoretical effect on quality in this case 
is indeterminate and may result in quality 
below efficient levels.
Evidence from a variety of reforms in 
England are generally consistent with 
these predictions. In the early 1990s, the 
creation of an internal market through a 
 purchaser–provider split allowed District 
Health Authorities (DHAs) with responsibil-
ity for meeting the health needs of their local 
population to purchase services from hospi-
tals. The aim was to make hospitals compete 
for the business of DHAs and of groups of 
general practitioners (GPs) who held funds 
to purchase care for their patients (“GP 
 fundholders”), thereby improving efficiency 
and quality. Following a change of govern-
ment in 1997, the purchaser–provider split 
remained in place and new geographically 
defined primary care trusts were set up to 
purchase services from primary care provid-
ers and hospitals. In the mid-2000s, the gov-
ernment experimented with a variant of GP 
fundholding known as practice-based com-
missioning (Bevan and van de Ven 2010). 
And in 2013, a new government established 
clinical commissioning groups to facilitate 
purchasing by groups of GPs.
Propper, Burgess, and Green (2004) 
examine the effects of hospital competition 
on mortality. They define catchment areas 
for each hospital, capture the number of hos-
pitals in each area, then weight this measure 
by the population each area serves. Their 
findings suggest that increased hospital com-
petition reduced quality; hospitals located 
in areas with more competition had higher 
death rates than those in areas with lower 
levels of competition, controlling for observ-
able differences in patient and  hospital 
 characteristics. The size of the effect is 
small, but robust. In a follow-up study, how-
ever, Propper, Burgess, and Gossage (2008) 
note that, where outcomes are easily observ-
able (wait times), hospitals had to compete 
on both price and quality (wait times) and 
competition led to improvements, but at the 
expense of quality measures that are more 
difficult to observe. Other evidence reviewed 
in Bevan and van de Ven (2010) suggests that 
NHS hospitals increased productivity and 
that, while wait times appeared to improve 
under GP fundholding, there did not appear 
to be much evidence of a reduction in costs. 
The GP fundholder model was in place 
from 1991 to 1999, when it was abolished. 
Dusheiko et al. (2006) use this policy rever-
sal to examine the effects of supply-side cost 
sharing on physician behavior. They find 
strong evidence that GP fundholding resulted 
in a decline in secondary admissions (as 
would be predicted by the theory). They find 
no evidence that the result of this was a sub-
stitution of emergency admissions for elec-
tive admissions through a GP. This suggests 
that incentivizing the gatekeeping function of 
GPs does result in less utilization, potentially 
resulting in worse care for patients. However, 
we review other effects of the reforms below 
(such as improved wait times for patients who 
were in GP fundholder groups) and a com-
plete analysis of the welfare effects of GP 
fundholding and related policies would need 
to take into account the combined effects.
Further reforms in England sought 
increased patient choice of the location, 
time, and day of elective surgery to reduce 
waiting times, and improve quality through 
competition, with money “following the 
patient” (DRGs) (Dixon, Robertson, and Bal 
2010). The reforms, commonly referred to as 
“Choose and Book,” were slow to get off the 
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ground. Dixon, Robertson, and Bal (2010) 
report that, as of 2008, less than half of GP 
referrals for outpatient appointments used 
the new system. Gaynor,  Moreno-Serra, and 
Propper (2010) examine evidence of increased 
consumer choice through “Choose and Book” 
and the introduction of DRGs. Using dis-
charge data and comparing variation in mar-
ket structure across hospitals through market 
concentration, they found that hospitals com-
peted on quality, resulting in improvements 
in mortality and length of stay. In a follow-up 
paper (Gaynor, Propper, and Seiler 2012), the 
authors estimate a structural demand model 
using data from the same reforms for coronary 
artery bypass graft surgery. Their estimates 
confirm that reforms giving patients choice of 
hospital increased patient elasticity of demand 
with respect to service quality. They found 
considerable heterogeneity in their estimates, 
with sicker patients responding more to the 
reform, but did not find significant response 
differences by income (Gaynor, Propper, and 
Seiler 2012).
Cooper et al. (2010) also examine the 
effects of increased competition in the NHS 
using a difference-in-differences approach 
with “exposure” to competition and time as 
the two differences. They find that, while 
increased competition among public sec-
tor hospitals improved productivity through 
shorter length of stay (particularly for 
 presurgery), competition between public 
and private hospitals had the opposite effect, 
with postsurgery length of stay increasing in 
public hospitals as a result of competition 
(presurgery lengths of stay remained rela-
tively unchanged). The authors offer patient 
selection (patients with less complicated 
cases being drawn to the private sector) as an 
explanation for these differing effects. 
Evidence from Australia also suggests 
mixed benefits from increased competition 
in a context where public and private hospi-
tals are competing for patients and have mul-
tiple payers (both government and private 
 insurance). Australia has a relatively high 
share of procedures in private hospitals, at 
around 30 percent of all inpatient  admissions, 
and high levels of private  insurance  coverage, 
at around 45 percent of the population 
(Palangkaraya and Yong 2013). In a setting 
where public and private hospitals compete 
on price and quality, Palangkaraya and Yong 
(2013) examine the effects of hospital com-
petition on mortality and readmissions using 
hospital discharge data. Their evidence sug-
gests that competition has mixed effects on 
quality: a small increase in mortality, but a 
larger decrease in unplanned readmissions. 
However, the research setting here does not 
allow for quasi-experimental control for other 
factors that may be associated with greater 
competition, which might bias the results. 
Once again, the evidence from the 
United Kingdom and Australia is consis-
tent with evidence from the introduction 
of drug coverage through Medicare Part D 
in the United States. Research there sug-
gests that the mechanisms used by govern-
ment to purchase prescription drugs, i.e., 
moving patients from individual purchasers 
to members of an insured group, can have 
strong effects on market outcomes, includ-
ing lowering optimal prices (in contrast to 
the standard insurance finding of an increase 
in prices). Their findings come from insur-
ers as part of the Medicare Part D program, 
which bundles insurance with a formulary 
and group purchasing. The reasons behind 
this counterintuitive result include the abil-
ity of insurance plans to bundle insurance 
with formularies and other mechanisms to 
create elastic demand. Individuals, unlike 
insurance plans, are not well informed about 
the substitutability of drugs, and doctors are 
generally not well informed about negotiated 
prices. Insurance plans, on the other hand, 
are able to provide rules and incentives to 
take advantage of both of these, resulting 
in lower prices. (Duggan and Scott Morton 
2010). 
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In sum, the literature finds mixed effects 
of competition on quality. This may be partly 
due to differences in quality measures with 
fairly uniform evidence on the relationship 
between quality and wait times and more 
mixed evidence on quality measures that 
are harder to consistently measure, such as 
 risk-adjusted mortality. 
5.2 Provider Payment: DRGs and P4P
The introduction of DRGs to pay for 
hospital care has been a major trend across 
OECD countries. Expressed policy reasons 
for this move include increased efficiency, 
transparency, the ability to increase volumes 
for select services, and cost containment. A 
review of the evidence across Europe sug-
gests that greater use of DRGs led to an 
increase in admission rates and a decline in 
the average length of stay, as would be pre-
dicted, suggesting improvements in quality 
(Busse et al. 2012). Evidence on the effect 
of DRGs on overall system costs, as distinct 
from per-unit costs, is more difficult to ascer-
tain, with some evidence of higher overall 
costs in France and limited evidence on 
costs in the United Kingdom and Germany 
(O’Reilly et al. 2012).
Reform of physician payment has mainly 
focused on linking payment to performance 
and the United Kingdom has experimented 
more substantially with P4P than any other 
European country. P4P was introduced 
to pay UK GPs in 2003, with 25 percent 
of GP income tied to meeting quality tar-
gets in a system known as the “Quality and 
Outcomes Framework” (QOF) (Doran et al. 
2008). QOF uses a list of sixty-five clinical 
quality indicators for patients in the prac-
tice. Payments are linearly related to the 
number of patients who achieve the indica-
tors as a ratio of those suitable for the indi-
cator. When patients are not suitable for 
the indicator, they are considered “excep-
tions.” This ensures that quality measures 
are not applied to those patients for whom 
they are not appropriate. However, it also 
allows GPs to exclude patients for whom 
they  cannot reach the quality standards. 
Doran et al. (2008) investigate both the 
degree to which GPs are meeting quality 
standards and the magnitude of exception 
reporting using GP data from Scotland. 
The results suggest that over 90 percent 
of practices achieved the highest level of 
P4P and that these practices exceeded the 
standard required to maximize pay. Only 
1 percent of patients seemed inappropri-
ately excepted. However, a follow-up study 
by Doran et al. (2010) uses  provider-level 
data to test whether physicians gamed the 
system to take advantage of the available 
financial rewards by not only increasing the 
number of patients treated successfully, but 
also by decreasing the number of patients 
eligible for treatment, thereby improving 
their ratios of treated patients and improv-
ing their financial reward. The study found 
evidence of such gaming behavior.
In terms of the effects of QOF on patient 
outcomes, the evidence suggests mixed suc-
cess. Campbell et al. (2007) examine the 
improvements in UK primary care using 
a longitudinal cohort study that spans the 
introduction of P4P and focuses on the 
management of three major chronic condi-
tions: asthma, coronary heart disease, and 
type 2 diabetes. While the authors note 
improvements in practice quality for all 
three of these groups over the 1998 to 2005 
period, the improvements began before the 
introduction of QOF, both for those clinical 
indicators that received financial incentives 
for improvement and those that did not. 
The study concludes that QOF is associated 
only with a modest acceleration in improve-
ment for asthma and diabetes.
A second investigation on the effects of 
QOF on quality of care by Serumaga et al. 
(2011) focuses on patients with hypertension. 
The study compares cohorts who started 
treatment in 2000 (several years before the 
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introduction of P4P in the UK) with those 
who started six months before the introduc-
tion of P4P. They conclude that there were 
no changes in incidence of adverse outcomes 
or mortality related to hypertension as a 
result of the implementation of P4P.
More recent evidence from a hospi-
tal P4P program (Sutton et al. 2012) uses 
a  difference-in-differences framework to 
examine the changes in mortality for patients 
admitted with pneumonia, heart failure, 
and AMI before and after the introduc-
tion of the Advancing Quality program—a 
hospital-based P4P program introduced in 
the northwest region of England, but not 
in the rest of the country. The findings sug-
gest improvements in mortality relative to 
the rest of the country and the authors note 
that, in comparison to other programs that 
have not found such large results, the pro-
gram had larger bonuses and greater invest-
ment by hospitals in quality-improvement 
activities. 
The evidence from the United Kingdom is 
reflected in evidence from the United States. 
For example, in the Medicaid market, Duggan 
(2004) finds that government contracts with 
HMOs to take on Medicaid patients resulted 
in higher costs per patient with no corre-
sponding improvement in (infant) health out-
comes. A review of the broader literature on 
P4P by Rosenthal and Frank (2006) suggests 
that the empirical evidence in support of P4P 
in the United States is weak. They note that, 
among the health care studies reviewed, many 
show no results. They also note, however, that 
many of these studies were small-scale inter-
ventions that may not have been picked up 
by physicians, and that the lack of outcomes 
here, therefore, may not be generalizable to 
larger-scale interventions. 
Overall, there has been convergence 
toward more use of market-like mechanisms 
in OECD health systems. These include wide 
adoption of DRGs to pay hospitals, attempts 
to encourage hospital competition and, more 
recently, greater efforts to link provider 
payment to performance. The evidence on 
hospital competition (summarized in table 
4) suggests that, where outcomes are easily 
observable or targeted (such as wait times), 
hospitals compete on price and quality (wait 
times), leading to improved outcomes. 
6. Coverage Decisions
Decisions about whom to cover (breadth), 
what to cover (scope), and how much of the 
cost to cover (depth) may have implications 
for efficiency, costs, and quality. In addition 
to coverage decisions, governments in many 
jurisdictions are often able to determine 
how quickly to provide services. Systems 
with fixed budgets or other budget-con-
straint mechanisms for health care provi-
sion generally employ price and nonprice 
rationing to control access and costs within 
the publicly financed system. One of the 
most common nonprice rationing mecha-
nisms is to limit access to care through 
wait lists. Indeed, long waiting times and 
care rationed by mechanisms other than 
price are often expressed concerns in U.S. 
policy debates around an increased role for 
government in the health care sector (c.f. 
Esmail 2009). Here, we focus on coverage 
breadth and scope and on waiting times 
(given the large role it plays in the debate 
around rationing care), as we discussed cov-
erage depth in the subsection on user fees. 
The empirical evidence reviewed is summa-
rized in table 5.
6.1 Demand For Insurance and Coverage 
Breadth and Scope
As all the countries that we review here 
have universal or nearly universal coverage, 
we examine the literature on the demand 
for insurance that complements these sys-
tems and hence helps define public coverage 
decisions. We do not address literature on 
the demand for insurance that supplements 
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TABLE 5 
Selected Empirical Papers Reviewed: Coverage Decisions
Author Time period Country covered Findings
Propper, Croxson, and 
Shearer (2002)
1993–1997 United Kingdom Patient waiting time reductions were secured where 
doctors paid for their patients’ care, but not where 
doctors chose hospitals only and did not pay. 
Siciliani and Martin 
(2007)
1999–2001 England More choice is significantly associated with lower 
waiting times at the sample mean (five hospitals), 
although the effect is modest. Also some evidence 
that this improves with more choice (i.e., more than 
eleven hospitals in catchment).
Cooper et al. (2009) 1997–2007 England Waiting times for patients having elective hip 
replacement, knee replacement, and cataract repair 
in England fell, as did variation in waiting times 
across socioeconomic groups.
Propper et al. (2010) 1997–2004 England and 
Scotland
The English policy of setting targets for elective 
care waiting times achieved its objectives: the 
length of time patients waited fell and admissions 
for elective care rose.
Wilcox et al. 2007 2000– 2005 Australia, Canada, 
England, New 
Zealand, and Wales
England has achieved the most sustained 
improvement, linked to major funding boosts, 
ambitious waiting-time targets, and a rigorous 
performance-management system. While supply-
side strategies are used in all five countries, New 
Zealand and parts of Canada have also invested in 
demand-side strategies (use of clinical criteria to 
prioritize access to surgery).
Hamilton, Hamilton, 
and Mayo 1996
1990– 1993 Canada Presurgery delay (for hip fracture) has little effect 
on postsurgery length of stay in hospital and 
inpatient mortality.
Carrier et al. 1993 1991–1992 Canada  Presurgery wait (elective open-heart surgery) had 
no effect on patient outcome after surgery. 
Guttmann et al. 2011 2003 –2007 Canada Presenting to an emergency department during 
shifts with longer waiting times, reflected in longer 
mean length of stay, is associated with a greater 
risk in the short term of death and admission to 
hospital in patients who are well enough to leave 
the department.
Alan et al. (2005) 1969–1996 Canada While program effects are muted when there are 
high deductibles, a nonsenior prescription drug 
subsidy is more redistributive than an equal-cost 
proportional income transfer, partly because of 
differential private HI coverage by income.
Hanley et al. (2008) 2000–2004 Canada Pharmaceutical financing became less regressive 
after the policy change. Results suggest that if 
the public financing of pharmaceuticals were 
maintained or increased, a change from age-based 
to income-based eligibility can unambiguously 
improve equity in financing.
(Continued)
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or “tops up” public coverage here1 (with 
the exception of the subsidies for insurance 
through tax systems), as it does not relate 
directly to coverage decisions within the 
public system (see Thomson and Mossialos 
2009 and Stabile and Townsend 2014 for 
reviews of this literature). 
While doctors and hospital services 
are universally and uniquely covered by 
the provincial health insurance plans in 
Canada, coverage of other services, such as 
1 The public finance literature explores the welfare 
effects of allowing for private topping up of universal pub-
lic benefits, comparing the effects of such a system to one 
where individuals either choose to participate in the ben-
efit program or opt out completely. See Currie and Gahvari 
(2008) for a review of this literature. 
 pharmaceuticals, dental services, and other 
nonhospital or doctor-based care is not uni-
versal. These services are covered by a mix 
of private and public insurance and public 
subsidy, depending on province of residence, 
age, and income (Stabile 2001). Several stud-
ies have looked at the financing and equity 
implications of this mixed public and private 
coverage, particularly around prescription 
drug coverage, which has been one of the 
fastest-growing components of health care 
costs in Canada over the past few decades 
(Alan et al. 2005). 
Research on the effects of public drug 
insurance programs explores the equity and 
cost implications of changes in pharmaceu-
tical coverage from age-based coverage to 
Author Time period Country covered Findings
Smart and Stabile 
(2005)
1986–2000 Canada Evidence of greater tax price elasticities (versus 
traditional point-of-service price elasticity 
estimates), but no evidence tax subsidy affects HI 
demand on the intensive margin.
Stabile (2002) 1995 Canada and  
United States
Tax subsidies encourage the provision of HI in 
smaller firms. Removal of them would cause the 
HI level in small (but not larger) firms to decline 
significantly. 
Hurley et al. (2002) 1995–2001 Australia Very limited cost savings; public system wait 
times unlikely to reduce; regulation complex; 
independent system of private finance not possible; 
quality plays a key role in driving the dynamics 
between the public and privately financed sectors; 
clear policy objectives are essential.
Johar et al. (2011) 2004–2005 Australia Expected waiting time does not increase the 
probability of buying insurance but a high 
probability of experiencing a long wait does. On 
average, waiting time has no significant impact on 
insurance.
Johar and Savage 
(2010)
2004–2005 Australia Private patients have shorter waiting times, and 
tend to be admitted ahead of their listing rank, 
especially for procedures that have low urgency 
levels.
TABLE 5 
Selected Empirical Papers Reviewed: Coverage Decisions (Continued)
507Stabile and Thomson: The Changing Role of Government in Financing Health Care
income-based coverage. In British Columbia, 
prior to 2003, the government provided cov-
erage for individuals age  sixty-five and older 
(similar to U.S. Medicare). In 2003, the 
province switched from age-based coverage 
to an income-based coverage program where 
the amount of coverage, deductible, and cost 
sharing varied by family income. The explicit 
goals of the policy change were a) to make 
the provincial drug program more sustain-
able and b) to increase fairness and equity 
within the drug program (Hanley et al. 
2008). A review of the equity consequences 
of the shift from age- to needs-based cov-
erage suggests that the coverage change 
did result in a less regressive drug program 
in British Columbia in terms of the out-of-
pocket funds paid for drugs. This change was 
driven by an increase in the out-of-pocket 
costs paid by higher-income seniors follow-
ing the policy change. Although the overall 
effect was to make the program less regres-
sive, the average out-of-pocket costs for 
l ow-income households also increased 
(Hanley et al. 2008). 
Apart from targeted public drug insur-
ance programs, the government of Canada 
provides significant subsidy for the purchase 
of voluntary health insurance through the 
tax code. Like the United States, Canada 
exempts employer contributions to health 
insurance from personal taxable income. 
The most recent review of these tax expen-
ditures suggest that they are on the order 
of $3 billion, annually (Department of 
Finance Canada 2012). Research examining 
the implications of these subsidies on link-
ing voluntary health insurance to the labor 
market suggest that there is a larger impact 
of the subsidies on the probability that small 
firms offer insurance in Canada (as well as 
the United States) and subsidies are less 
likely to affect the decision of larger firms to 
offer insurance, given the other advantages 
(large risk pools and administrative efficien-
cies) available to large firms (Stabile 2002). 
The evidence here suggests that, in the 
absence of these subsidies, complementary 
drug coverage offered through small firms 
would decline significantly (on the order of 
50 percent). 
In addition to subsidizing the purchase 
of insurance through an employer, the 
Canadian system, like the U.S. system, 
allows for deductions and credits for out-of-
pocket health-care expenditures when these 
expenditures exceed a certain share of per-
sonal income. As with the employer deduc-
tion, the subsidy varies with the individual’s 
marginal tax rate. Evidence exploring the 
effects of these subsidies also confirms sig-
nificant tax-price elasticities with respect 
to all health care expenditures, and with 
respect to the purchase of voluntary health 
insurance (Smart and Stabile 2005). There 
is no evidence, however, that these subsidies 
affect the purchase of health insurance on 
the intensive margin. This is likely because 
both insurance premiums and out-of-pocket 
spending are eligible for the tax credit, 
leaving the relative price of market health 
insurance and self insurance unchanged in 
Canada (Smart and Stabile 2005). In sum, 
the subsidies have increased coverage rates 
substantially, but at the cost of significant 
public revenue loss and reduced equity. 
Australia has also promoted voluntary pri-
vate health insurance along with the pub-
lic system through the use of tax subsidies 
through large universal rebates on private 
insurance purchases, lifetime community 
rating based on the age at which insurance 
is first purchased, as well as tax surcharges 
on high earners who do not purchase private 
insurance. Evidence on the effects of these 
large subsidies on insurance take-up unsur-
prisingly finds large increases in private 
insurance take-up (Hurley et al. 2002) and 
selection into insurance by individuals who 
expect to be heavy users of hospital services 
(Savage and Wright 2003). Additionally, the 
evidence suggests that the combination of tax 
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subsidies and the effects of private systems 
on health care input costs (both in the short 
and long run) limit the potential cost savings 
for the public sector (Hurley et al. 2002). 
The authors note that there is no conclusive 
evidence from Australia that shows a decline 
in public waiting times following the intro-
duction of a parallel private system, nor that 
public costs were reduced when the overall 
cost of the policies are taken into account. 
6.2 Economic Evaluation and Coverage 
Scope
Many health systems employ health 
technology assessment (HTA) and various 
degrees of economic evaluation (for exam-
ple, cost effectiveness analysis) to determine 
what the publicly financed benefits pack-
age should cover. In addition to considering 
whether a particular service or treatment 
should be funded, assessing bodies can also 
consider best practices within accepted treat-
ments to reduce harmful or costly  treatment 
variation. HTA is not, however, unique to 
publicly-financed insurance—all payers 
must decide what they will and will not pay 
for, and many attempt to elicit best prac-
tices from their providers to ensure quality, 
safety, and efficiency. There is an extensive 
literature on methods of economic evalu-
ation (c.f. Drummond et al. 2005; Garber 
2000). Garber (2000), building on Garber 
and Phelps (1997), explores the relationship 
between economic analysis and decision 
making by the insurer. Where the decision is 
based on the average risk in the population, 
the insurance company or public insurer will 
cover those services with the maximum net 
benefit. Garber and Phelps (1997) note that 
only those services whose expected benefits 
equal or exceed costs will be insured, and 
these will be included in the premium. In 
the case of a government insurer, it is pos-
sible that a broader set of costs and benefits 
will be used in any economic evaluation, as 
all costs and benefits to society should be 
relevant. This may lead to different deci-
sions about what to cover. The perspective 
of a managed-care company, for example, 
would ignore producer surplus. However, 
given that the relevant population for gov-
ernment may not include producers outside 
the boundaries of the state, this distinction is 
perhaps not as applicable in practice (Pauly 
1995 and Garber 2000).
Several countries have set up bodies aimed 
at increasing the use of HTA. For exam-
ple, the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) was established 
in England in 1999 to ensure that treat-
ment decisions would be based on the best 
available clinical evidence, and many other 
countries have followed suit. However, evi-
dence of the effectiveness of HTA is limited. 
Evidence from NICE suggests, for example, 
that very few appraisals of new technologies 
have had a negative outcome (NICE 2010). 
Where NICE has recommended restrict-
ing the use of technologies, there have been 
some savings to the NHS, but part of the cost 
has been shifted to patients, limiting overall 
cost containment (Richards 2008). 
6.3 Access to Care and Wait Times
In the absence of prices as a form of 
demand control, the optimal wait for care will 
be one that balances marginal social costs and 
marginal social benefits. Assuming that the 
longer the wait for inpatient  treatment, the 
lower the total cost of care in present value 
terms, then the optimal wait will depend 
both on total costs and the nature of the 
benefit curve—i.e., how the benefit of treat-
ment changes with delay in being treated. In 
contrast to a market clearing price, waiting 
imposes a cost on the patient by delaying 
care; it also results in a deadweight loss, as 
there is lost consumer surplus and no gain 
to the producer. Gravelle and Siciliani (2008) 
note that in the presence of moral hazard, 
some wait time may be optimal, but the 
assumptions required for such a result to be 
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welfare increasing include that the marginal 
cost of waiting be higher for patients with a 
smaller benefit from treatment (Gravelle and 
Siciliani 2008). If wait times are required, it 
is optimal for those patients who face the 
greatest gain to receive the shortest wait 
and for those with no potential gain to wait 
an infinite amount of time. However, in the 
absence of perfect information, shorter wait 
times should be offered to those groups with 
higher expected gains (Gravelle and Siciliani 
2009). Therefore, whereas most private 
insurance schemes impose a uniform cost 
across all patients, publicly financed care 
often imposes wait times that will not be uni-
form, and depend instead on the potential 
gains from treatment and the deadweight 
loss of waiting. 
Propper, Croxson, and Shearer (2002) 
investigate the relationship between GP 
fundholding in England and wait times. GP 
fundholding allowed some GPs to purchase 
services on behalf of their patients as part of 
a larger set of reforms to encourage hospital 
competition and lower wait times (discussed 
previously). All transactions were within 
the publicly financed health care system. 
The authors examine hospital wait times for 
over 100,000 elective hospital admissions in 
England between 1993 and 1997. They find 
that patients with GP fundholders waited 
less time, all else equal, than nonfundholder 
patients. The longest reductions in waits 
were found in those areas with the longest 
wait times a priori. They find limited evi-
dence of spillover effects for nonfundholder 
patients, or for other areas of practice. They 
conclude that it was the ability to pay for 
shorter wait times from within the public 
system, and not the ability to choose the hos-
pital for the procedure (fundholders could 
purchase services without specifically paying 
for lower waits) that resulted in shorter wait 
times (Propper, Croxson, and Shearer 2002). 
Siciliani and Martin (2007) also examine 
the relationship between increased choice in 
NHS hospitals (through the policies exam-
ined above) and wait times using data from 
120 hospitals between 1999 and 2001. They 
use similar measures of market concentra-
tion to Propper, Burgess, and Green (2004, 
reviewed previously) and find a modest 
reduction in wait times from increased com-
petition. Their results also imply that there 
is an optimal number of hospitals competing 
with each another and that, once the opti-
mal number is exceeded (between eleven 
and fourteen hospitals in a catchment area), 
further increases in the number of hospitals 
competing can result in increased wait times. 
The authors do not provide an explanation 
for this result, but note that the effect is 
modest. 
Research by Cooper et al. (2009) also 
examines how the policies outlined herein, 
as well as increased funding by the UK gov-
ernment, affected wait times for care. They 
document a steady decline in wait times for 
hip, knee, and cataract procedures in the 
NHS between 2000 and 2007 (after an initial 
increase in wait times). As wait times fell, the 
variation in wait time across socioeconomic 
status also fell, improving equity. While the 
evidence presented is not causal, and the 
authors do not try and link particular parts of 
the UK reforms to the declines in wait times 
and improvements in equity, they do claim 
that “the post-2000 government reforms did 
not lead to the inequitable distribution of 
wait times across groups that many people 
predicted” (Cooper et al. 2009, p. 5). 
Propper et al. (2010) examine the use of 
targets in the UK as a tool to reduce wait 
times. They exploit the natural experiment 
generated by the introduction of targets 
in England, but not Scotland, to identify 
whether target setting for wait lists led to 
a fall in wait times in England. They find a 
reduction in waiting times of thirteen days, 
on average. While levels of elective care rose 
to reduce wait times, they did not find reduc-
tions in nontargeted activity to offset these 
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changes. They also find no evidence of a 
fall in patient quality, some evidence of an 
increase in the quality of care, and some evi-
dence of wait list “manipulation,” whereby 
patients were removed either temporarily 
or permanently from the list. Overall, the 
authors conclude that targets successfully 
lowered wait times in England, with little 
evidence of adverse side effects. 
Wait times have been identified as a per-
sistent policy problem in Canada, as well 
(Wilcox et al. 2007). A few studies have tried 
to assess the impact of longer wait times in 
Canada in terms of health outcomes. A chal-
lenge in measuring the impact of longer waits 
is that, in addition to any health differences, 
there may be nonhealth measures such as 
pain or lost income or leisure that are more 
difficult to measure. However, much of the 
literature focuses on more easily measured 
outcomes such as length of stay  postsurgery or 
mortality. One such study examines patients 
with hip fractures in Quebec admitted to 
hospital between 1990 and 1993 (Hamilton, 
Hamilton, and Mayo 1996). After controlling 
for patient health and for both observed and 
unobserved individual and hospital charac-
teristics, wait time for surgery had little effect 
on postsurgery length of stay or mortality. 
Studies in the medical literature looking at 
open-heart surgery (Carrier, Tremblay, and 
Pelletier 1993) similarly find little difference 
in postoperative outcomes. However, a study 
looking at wait times for admission into hos-
pitals through the ER in Canada found that 
presenting to an ER when there is a longer 
wait had a higher risk of death or admission 
in the short term (Guttmann et al. 2011). 
The authors use a retrospective cohort study 
and health administrative data from Ontario 
to track patients who were either seen and 
discharged or left without being seen. They 
find an increase in both mortality and admis-
sion to hospital among patients who pres-
ent during shifts with long mean wait times. 
However, patients who left without being 
seen were not at increased risk of adverse 
events. 
Australia also experiences issues with wait 
times and the government has pushed pri-
vate insurance through explicit subsidies as a 
solution to both long wait times and increased 
public expenditures (Vaithianathan 2002). As 
noted above, a large number of Australians 
(45 percent) hold private insurance cover-
age in order to obtain faster and premium 
service. Johar et al. (2011) explore the extent 
to which the decision to purchase insurance 
in Australia is a function of expected wait 
times. Using hospital administrative data, 
they model the effect of expected wait time 
for a procedure on the demand for insur-
ance. The authors impute expected wait 
times using a variety of health conditions 
available in administrative data. Contrary 
to anecdotal evidence in Australia, they find 
that the demand for insurance is insensitive 
to expected waiting times, although they do 
find that it is sensitive to wait times for the 
upper end of the wait-time distribution. One 
limitation of the study is that the demand 
for insurance as modeled does not include a 
number of possible characteristics of private 
insurance, such as access to certain doctors. 
It is also unclear whether perceived long 
wait times by individuals before they actu-
ally experience illness isn’t the driving fac-
tor in people’s decision to seek insurance. 
Evidence of the difference in wait times 
for people with and without private insur-
ance suggests that privately insured patients 
receive much faster care, not only in private 
hospitals but also in public ones (Johar and 
Savage 2010).
There is less evidence that wait times 
are a problem in Germany, France, and 
Switzerland. An international comparison 
of wait times by Siciliani and Hurst (2004) 
suggests that there is some evidence that 
those countries that do not report prob-
lems with wait times spend slightly more, 
have higher levels of capacity as measured 
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by number of hospital beds and doctors 
per capita, and have higher levels of inpa-
tient activities. They are also more likely to 
use DRGs to pay hospitals (at the time the 
study was carried out; now most use DRGs) 
and fee-for-service to pay physicians. They 
do not find evidence, however, that coun-
tries that do not report high levels of wait 
times are more productive (as measured by 
inpatients per physician). 
In sum, the evidence reviewed and listed 
in table 5 suggests that, while wait times are 
not a problem across all countries, where they 
are a problem, governments have been able to 
reduce them when they have chosen to focus 
explicitly on achieving this goal. Efforts to 
expand coverage beyond hospital and physi-
cian services, or to promote voluntary health 
insurance through tax subsidies, have been 
mixed across countries, with some evidence of 
inefficient use of tax subsidies and other poli-
cies to  promote  voluntary insurance alongside 
publicly financed coverage. 
7. Implications for Health System 
Efficiency, Costs, Quality
7.1 Lessons Learned
What lessons can we draw from the evi-
dence summarized above and what ques-
tions remain unanswered? In terms of 
collection, many countries are exploring new 
ways of generating revenues for health care 
to enable them to cope with significant cost 
growth. However, there is little evidence to 
suggest that collection mechanisms alone 
are effective in managing the cost or quality 
of care. First, the traditional classification of 
tax-financed versus social insurance systems 
does not determine how countries organize 
health financing functions to achieve policy 
goals. The evidence available on the relation-
ship between financing and outcomes sug-
gests that health systems financed through 
social insurance (as opposed to general tax 
revenues) tend to be more regressive and 
have smaller tax bases. Some evidence sug-
gests that financing through social insurance 
versus general tax revenues is associated 
with higher cost growth over time, although 
it is difficult, using such a broad classifica-
tion, to separate collection mechanisms from 
other characteristics more often found in 
tax-financed jurisdictions, such as budget 
and price controls and quasi-hard budget 
constraints. Public health-care funding in 
tax-based systems tends to track GDP more 
closely than in countries that collect funds 
through social insurance. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, many jurisdictions are moving 
toward a diversity of funding streams (add-
ing  tax-based funding to social insurance) to 
manage health care expenditure growth and 
maintain universality. Theory and evidence 
on cost sharing through standard user fees 
suggests that, for the purpose of revenue 
collection, it is not clear, given the adminis-
trative costs involved, that user fees are an 
optimal means of supplementing taxes and 
contributions in developed health systems. 
The evidence on value-based cost sharing 
(using cost sharing selectively to encourage 
patients to use medication, services, and 
providers that offer better value than other 
options, rather than simply applying user 
fees across the board) suggests some effi-
ciency improvements in the use of care. 
European systems with competitive 
health insurance (historically only found in 
 countries that use social insurance to finance 
health care) have multiple risk pools, which 
can lead to selection issues and inefficien-
cies. All have significantly improved their 
risk equalization schemes in the last ten 
years and many now have relatively sophisti-
cated formulas that include health-based risk 
adjusters. In spite of this, insurers’ incen-
tives to select risks are substantial and there 
continues to be (largely circumstantial) evi-
dence of risk selection and hence, potential 
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 inefficiencies in risk pooling. In some cases, 
such as Switzerland, the voluntary insurance 
market seems to exacerbate risk selection and 
it would make sense to segment these mar-
kets to avoid this behavior. Recent evidence 
from the United States offers two reasons for 
optimism on this front. The first is that risk 
adjustment continues to improve and there 
is evidence that more detailed data on use, 
coupled with restrictions on ability to change 
insurer, can significantly mitigate risk selec-
tion. As a result, there is likely to continue to 
be convergence across countries towards bet-
ter risk selection strategies. Second, recent 
empirical evidence examining insurance 
choice by individuals in the United States 
has found that preferences, in addition to 
risk, are important determinants of insurance 
choice, so the welfare implications of adverse 
selection by individuals in many markets may 
be smaller than previously thought.
Where purchasing is concerned, there 
has been some convergence among OECD 
health systems towards more use of 
 market-like mechanisms, particularly the 
adoption of DRGs to pay hospitals. Some 
countries have also attempted to encourage 
hospital competition and, more recently, a 
growing number of countries have tried to 
link provider payment to performance. The 
evidence on hospital competition suggests 
that, where outcomes are easily observ-
able or targeted (such as wait times), hos-
pitals compete on price and quality (wait 
times),  leading to improved outcomes. In 
some cases, improvements have been at 
the expense of quality measures that are 
more difficult to observe, suggesting that 
it would be useful to have further com-
parable, well-defined measures of quality 
beyond wait times. However, where prices 
are set administratively, competition has 
improved productivity and quality. DRG 
payment also appears to have improved 
productivity and quality, although its effect 
on overall system costs is mixed. There is 
some evidence (mainly from the United 
Kingdom) of improved physician produc-
tivity and patient outcomes following the 
introduction of P4P, although the evidence 
also suggests a degree of gaming to maxi-
mize financial incentives.
A number of the health systems we 
explore continue to use wait times as a 
source of  nonprice rationing. The evidence 
on the effects of wait times on health out-
comes is mixed, with more recent studies 
finding negative effects on patient health 
and readmission rates, and older studies 
finding little effect on health outcomes. The 
United Kingdom in particular, and to some 
extent Canada, have significantly reduced 
wait times by increasing volumes using forms 
of DRG funding loosely modeled on U.S. 
Medicare and through targeted budgets. 
Wait times are, therefore, not inherent in 
tax-financed systems, but can be fairly suc-
cessfully manipulated by policy levers such 
as targets, DRGs, and nonprice competition 
between hospitals. 
7.2 Unresolved Questions
Our review has revealed some areas where 
there is a need for a greater evidence base. 
First, while efforts to be more systematic 
about defining the publicly provided or man-
dated benefits package have increased over 
the past decade, there is a lack of evidence 
on how effective these changes have been. 
Organizations such as NICE in the United 
Kingdom, the Canadian Agency for Drugs 
and Technologies, the German Institute 
for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care, 
or the French National Health Authority, 
have emerged in many countries in the last 
decade, showing how jurisdictions increas-
ingly recognize the importance of economic 
evaluation of best practice and technologies. 
However, we found little evidence on the 
extent to which these bodies have achieved 
their goals and some evidence to suggest 
they struggle with implementation.
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Efforts in systems such as Canada’s to 
expand coverage beyond hospital and phy-
sician services, or to promote voluntary 
insurance through tax subsidies, have been 
mixed. A combination of tax deductions 
and subsidies has resulted in high levels of 
voluntary private insurance coverage for 
nonpublicly financed services, but these 
subsidies have led to substantial and poorly 
targeted tax expenditures and continued 
reliance on the firm as the provider of vol-
untary coverage. Attempts to provide pub-
lic coverage selectively to older people have 
also been expensive, while reforms aimed at 
retargeting benefits based on income have 
lowered public costs and had some positive 
redistributive consequences. The countries 
we examine, therefore, provide evidence 
of the inefficiencies of tax subsidies and 
of inefficiencies associated with voluntary 
insurance alongside publicly financed cov-
erage, but do not provide particularly help-
ful evidence on the efficient mix of public 
and private finance. 
The past ten to fifteen years have seen 
high health-care cost growth in many coun-
tries, including all those reviewed here, with 
average health care cost growth exceed-
ing average growth in GDP (Hagist and 
Kotlikoff 2005). In considering the success 
of different health systems in controlling 
costs, the evidence suggests that, while poli-
cies that effectively limit demand through 
rationing and fixed budgets still appear to 
be effective at holding down costs at a point 
in time, there has been a discernible shift 
in policies employed by the countries we 
review away from these types of cost con-
tainment strategies. There has also been a 
shift away from other strategies that simply 
transfer costs to households, toward policies 
that focus more on the cost–benefit ratio and 
efficiency, such as greater use of HTA and 
activity-based funding with administratively 
set prices. While there are high hopes that 
these strategies will produce a more efficient 
use of health care resource and, ideally, con-
trol cost growth, further research is needed 
to determine the extent to which these poli-
cies achieve their goals. 
8. Conclusions
This review examines the changing role of 
government in financing health care outside 
the United States. It focuses on policy choices 
made by a number of OECD countries 
around four financing functions—raising 
revenue, pooling risk, purchasing services, 
and making coverage decisions. It reviews 
the evidence of the effects of these choices 
on efficiency, costs, and quality. In doing so, 
it offers some insight into how nations with 
universal or near universal health coverage 
are performing as they grapple with having 
to finance increased health care costs, seek to 
avoid risk selection in their insurance pools, 
and promote efficiency in the purchase and 
use of health care services at all levels of the 
system. 
Each health system has unique attributes 
that help explain some of the behavior of 
providers and patients. Nevertheless, many 
of the empirical studies reviewed here offer 
supporting evidence that crosses jurisdic-
tions. Indeed, there has been some conver-
gence in policies adopted across countries to 
improve financing incentives and encourage 
efficient utilization. In the case of risk pool-
ing, all countries with competing pools are 
experiencing similar difficulties with selec-
tion and are adopting more sophisticated 
forms of risk adjustment. In the case of 
hospital competition, the key drivers of suc-
cess appear to be what is competed on and 
measurable, rather than whether the system 
is public or private. In the case of both the 
success of P4P and issues resulting from wait 
times, evidence differs within and across 
jurisdictions. However, the evidence does 
suggest that a number of governments have 
effectively reduced wait times when they 
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have chosen explicitly to focus incentives on 
achieving this goal. 
While the United States remains an out-
lier among OECD countries, a number of 
policy changes across jurisdictions suggest 
significant convergence in the role of the 
state in financing health care. These changes, 
coupled with the introduction of a universal 
mandate in the United States, suggest that 
many of the lessons learned above may apply 
in the United States as well. Greater gov-
ernment involvement will not prevent sig-
nificant innovation in incentives for efficient 
purchasing and provision. Nor will it prevent 
patients from being able to choose insurer 
or provider, or automatically result in longer 
wait times for treatment. The evidence also 
suggests, however, that further government 
involvement in the health care sector without 
price or volume controls will not necessarily 
lead to more use of economic evaluation or 
to lower growth rates in the cost of care—
consequences many people associate with a 
greater role for the state. 
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